Helping and grabbing-hand models have been used to explain behavior of governments in transition economies. Russia has in particular been associated with the grabbing hand and behavior in China with the helping hand. In this paper we show using the evidence on China how grabbing and helping hand behavior is sensitive to revenue-sharing incentives in a fiscal federal structure. We propose a model of interaction between local and central government where the central government chooses the revenue-sharing rule and local government chooses between helping and grabbing hand behavior toward private economic activity in its jurisdiction. We formulate measures of the helping hand and grabbing hand, and apply the model using the measures to an empirical investigation of local-center fiscal relations. Empirical results confirm the predictions of the model of a change in China from helping to grabbing hand in the 1990s, and therefore indicate convergence in government behavior from the previously emphasized difference.
Introduction
The distinction between grabbing and helpful hands has arisen in particular in explanations of behavior of government in transition economies. In Russia, the Ukraine, and elsewhere, government officials have been described as having grabbing hands (see Frye and Shleifer 1997 , Shleifer 1997 , Gelb et al. 1998 , Levin and Satarov 2000 , Blejer and Škreb, 2001 ). In China, however, behavior of government officials has been interpreted as fortuitously more consistent with a helping hand (see Oi 1992 Oi , 1994 McKinnon 1992; Montinola et. al.1995; Weingast 1996,1997; Jin et. al. 1999 ).
In Russia, local governments did not benefit from an expansion in the local tax base, because increases in tax revenues of local government incurred offsetting tax remission to the center. Local governments therefore had no incentive for helping hand behavior that expanded the local tax base (Zhuravskaya 2000) . The incentive of local governments was to grab where possible before the central government could stake its claim.
The incentive for the helping hand was present in China because of self-interest of local political decision makers and officials. Local governments in China gained through informal shares of the profits of local business that were being helped, and also through the tax revenue to which the regional government was the residual claimant under a revenue-sharing rule. Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) propose that the success of the helping hand under China's fiscal federal structure is also attributed to the authority of the center to appoint and fire provincial governors with grabbing hands.
The praise for the fiscal federalism in China contrasts with studies that pointed to problematical aspects of inter-government relations.
The problems included regional protectionism, self-seeking intervention by local government officials in business, and erosion of central government authority (see Chen 1991 Chen , 1995 Wong 1987 Wong , 1991 .
Because of these problems, the central government of China changed central-local fiscal relations in 1994. Local government was no longer the residual claimant to tax revenue, and restrictions were placed and enforced on benefits that local government could provide to local business.
In this paper we investigate the consequences of this change in behavior of local government officials. We begin in Section II by setting out the background of change in centrallocal fiscal relations. Section III presents a model that sets out the interdependence between central and local governments when the center can choose between seeking high or low taxes for itself, and local government chooses between helping and grabbing hand behavior. Section IV quantifies helping and grabbing hand behavior. The measures are used for empirical estimates that confirm the replacement of the helping hand by the grabbing hand. Conclusions are summarized in the final section.
II. Taxation and Fiscal Federalism in China
Before the introduction of market oriented economic reforms in China in the late 1970s, local governments were not responsible for their expenditure because it was financed by the uniform national budget. They did not have incentive to increase revenue either because all revenue also reverted to the uniform national budget. With the intent of stopping declines in budget revenues, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) introduced a center-local government revenue-sharing system in 1977. Under the new system, local government collected taxes and entered into a long-term revenue-sharing contract with the central government. The contract specified the total tax revenues to be remitted to the central government, and left local government as a residual claimant to taxes collected in the local tax jurisdiction. The contract changed the incentives of local government officials from seeking rents from the center, to enhancing the local tax base.
Revenue sharing was experimented first in Jiangsu and a few provinces, and was deemed a success by MOF because it brought more certainty to the central government budgetary revenue and subsequently extended to all provincial-level governments in 1980 (Chen 1998a) .
Surprisingly, revenue sharing generated an important and yet unintended politicaleconomy consequence. It was generally identified as a reform measure introduced by the reformist leaders. With local government officials now beneficiaries of economic reform, reformist leaders at the center had pro-reform support from regional politicians. The balance of pro-reform and anti-reform forces changed and reformists were able to proceed with broad reform measures (Chen 1995) .
Regional governments also became more sensitive to spontaneous local calls for policy changes, and played a pivotal role in state-society interactions that were important in China's reform process (Chen 1998b) . Regional governments had incentives to promote market reform and economic growth, and China became an example of successful "market-preserving federalism" (Jin et. al. 1999 ).
The new tax system satisfied central government needs in the early 1980s. The assured tax revenue for the center satisfied the conservatives at the MOF. The reformist leaders at the center were also satisfied, because the tilt in the balance of political dominance allowed a strategy of "playing to the provinces", to circumvent the vested interests of line ministries at the central government level (Shirk 1993 ).
The revenue-sharing system was however not sustainable under the conditions of economic change. As was common at the beginning of transition (see Bogetic and Hillman 1995) , government in China relied principally on the state sector for tax revenue at a time when revenues of state-owned enterprises were in decline because of overall decline in the state sector and because of competition from new non-state competitors. In China the familiar circumstances of lower tax revenues emerged. Tax revenue collected by local governments for sharing with the center declined, 1 and tax revenue collected directly by the central government and not shared with provinces declined by an even greater magnitude.
At the same time, the richer provinces, which were net remitters of tax revenue to the center, increased their share of tax revenue. 2 The increased revenue share of the richer provinces reflected the revenue sharing rule, under which regional governments were obligated to provide stipulated tax remittances, but were residual claimants for tax surpluses.
[Insert Table 1 here]
The central government consequently had less income to redistribute to poorer provinces, and the revenue share of the provinces receiving subsidies from the center declined. 3 The central government was, in this period, on the verge of bankruptcy, and frequently sought to renegotiate the tax-sharing agreements with local governments. Richer provinces were asked to make additional "contributions" to the central government.
1 Total budgetary revenue declined from 23.7% of GDP in 1985 to 13.5% in 1993 (See Table 1 ). Budgetary revenue shared between the center and provinces declined from 14.4% of GDP to 10.8% during the same period. 2 From 61.8% in 1985 to 85.8% in 1993 . 3 From 142% in 1986 to 113% in 1993 . Shares were more than 100% because of subsidies received from the center.
Since the center did not have its own tax collection administration, it had no alternative therefore but to rely on tax revenue remittances from regional governments. The regional governments, however, had ready means of avoiding tax remittance obligations. They could in particular withhold remittances by diverting tax revenues from budget to off-budget items that
were not subject to sharing with the center. Revenue could also be kept from the center by giving regional enterprises tax holidays and exemptions (Wong 1991) . These activities by regional government were consistent with their residual claimant position for tax revenues. The tax exemptions increased resources for local investment and expanded the future local tax base.
The close ties of local government officials to local enterprises also had disadvantageous consequences. Bureaucratic involvement in management of local business firms was not always beneficial because regional government officials had reasons to protect their participation in local investment by adopting local protectionist policies that impeded free movement of goods across regional boundaries. With regional banks under their close supervision, regional governments could also selectively direct credit to local enterprises. The regions became independent economic fiefdoms (Chen 1995) , and a proliferation of small-scale high-cost activities was inefficiently duplicated across localities.
Regional government was however now an impediment to change and resisted attempts at re-centralization (see Chen, 1991) . By the early 1990s, the central government sought to centralize the fiscal system. A new tax-sharing system (TSS) was subsequently introduced in 1994. The new fiscal system identified exclusive central and local government tax bases. There were also shared taxes that included, most importantly, the value-added tax. A central tax bureau was set up to collect the center's taxes. Local tax bureaus continued to collected local taxes. As an incentive for compliance from local government, the center agreed to a special transfer payment (shuishou fanhuan or tax repayment) to provinces to ensure local revenues did not decline. The reference point was provincial government revenue in 1993. 4 The new system ended the downward trend of budgetary revenue to GDP and increased the share of the center in total budgetary revenue.
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The revenue shares of the regional governments at the same time significantly declined.
6
Regional government also lost discretion to grant tax reductions and exemptions to their local 4 The objective of the central government was to increase its share of total tax revenues from 40% to 60%. 5 In 1998 total budgetary revenue was 12.8% of GDP, only slightly below the 13.5% in 1993. 6 Budgetary revenue shares for remitting provinces fell from 85.8% in 1993 to 61.8% in 1998. The provinces that were recipients of subsidies from the center also experienced revenue losses. Their share of revenue declined from 112.7% to 86.3% in the same period (Table 1) . Since their share dropped below 100% after 1994, these provinces also became net contributors to the center's budget revenue.
enterprises. Banks were re-organized and re-centralized. 7 The center also tightened control over extra-budgetary funds, which were re-channeled into budget items. 8 Extra-budgetary charges and ad hoc levies were also placed under central government scrutiny.
The re-centralization took place at a time when the central leadership felt that the political support from the provincial governments was less important. 9 The re-centralization measures were implemented, despite unpopularity at the regional level. Provincial leaders were at the same time removed and replacements appointed. 10 Local governments were also given additional expenditure responsibilities while being compelled to give up revenue sources. The central government set annual growth targets for central tax revenue, under threat of removing tax bureau chiefs if targets were not met.
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Compliance was based on coercion and administrative orders, not on compatible incentives and budgetary laws. Tax revenue targets were based on pre-achieved levels and were subject to ratchet effects, so that high tax collection in one year implied a higher target for the following year. Officials at the tax offices therefore had no incentive to collect revenue beyond the tax target. Local government revenue targets could also be met by simultaneously inflating tax revenue and expenditure. 12 The central tax bureau used any means of meeting the tax-revenue target, even if the consequence was only notional and not actual revenue for the central budget.
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The central government reacted by assigning itself yet more tax revenue from the regions or from outside the budget. Uncertainty and mistrust were introduced into the tax sharing system, as the center repeatedly and arbitrarily using administrative orders to redefine tax-sharing rules. 7 The branches of the People's Bank of China were re-organized with regional headquarters following the Federal Reserve System of the United States. Managers of state owned bank were no longer under the supervision of local governments, and major bank loans had to go through the Credit Approval Committee in which local governments have no representation. 8 See Zhang (1999) . 9 After the Communist Party formally adopted the "socialist market economy" as the objective of economic reform at its 14 th congress in 1992 and with the old generation of revolutionary leaders passed the scene, there were no major political obstacles for market reform in China. Nor were there major challenges to the new leadership at the center. 10 See Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) . 11 When the center wanted to increase its tax revenue by an additional 100 billion yuan in 1998, it just held a telephone/video conference to mobilize tax collection. 12 The center actually made it easy for local governments to do so. In an effort to promote certain sectors of the economy, the central government started the practice of xianzheng houfan, lieshou liezhi -taxes collected from enterprises in privileged sectors were returned to these enterprises while the amount was recorded under both revenue and expenditure. The practice proliferated because local governments found it very useful. They could effectively grant tax exemptions and inflate budgetary revenue and expenditure at the same time. 13 For example, 13 types of extra-budgetary revenues were brought into the budget to boost the budgetary revenues in 1997, but the spending plans is still determined by the administrative agencies that collect the funds. This means that this part of budgetary revenue is not available for normal government expenditure and the increase in the budgetary revenue is artificial.
Regional governments in turn responded by finding more means of hiding revenues from the center. Since the central government and its departments were collecting additional extrabudgetary revenues, it was difficult to stop local governments from doing the same. Financial resources overall thus increasingly came outside budgetary control (Zhang 1999) . Extra-budgetary revenue had been prevalent in the pre-reform era, and was expanded under the fiscal system of the post-reform period. Local governments were permitted to collect fees and charges outside the budget when government revenue was inadequate to cover expenses.
This eroded the tax base, led to more budget deficits, and to the imposition of yet more offbudget fees and charges. The vicious cycle was reinforced by the post-1994 re-centralization. 14 In 1998, the central government outlawed more than 20,000 different types of ad hoc fees and charges that were being collected by government departments (Wang 1999) . Replacement fees and charges were however invented and collected. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that disorganized corruption is more averse to economic development than organized corruption. When corruption is disorganized, different ministries, agencies and levels of local governments independently seek personal revenue (through bribes) without accounting for the adverse effects of their independent appropriation activities. The cumulative burden on private individuals is increased, and private economic activity is impeded. Olson's (1993 Olson's ( , 2000 distinction between stationary and roving bandits describes the effects on appropriating behavior of narrow and encompassing personal stakes. An encompassing interest leads government officials to provide a helping hand to private initiatives (while still taking), and corruption is limited and organized. The roving bandit takes and moves on, and does not care for what can be taken tomorrow. With corruption disorganized, the helping hand (helping itself as well) becomes a grabbing hand.
The officials of China's local governments had helping-hand encompassing interests in the 1980s, when revenue sharing made them residual claimants to revenue in their localities. The encompassing interest was transformed to narrow interest as resources were increasingly placed outside the budget by different government agencies and when the post-1994 re-centralization ended the local residual claimancy for tax revenues. The ensuing change in the form of localgovernment corruption meant that China's fiscal federal structure was no longer "market-preserving". The distinction between the helping hand model for China and the grabbing hand model for post-Soviet countries was lost as the grabbing hand also made its appearance in China.
III. A Model of Center-Local Government Interaction
Why would rational persons institute a system that replaced the helping hand with the grabbing hand? That is, if the outcomes are undesirable, why did the change from the helping to the grabbing hand take place? In this section, we set out a model of center-local government interaction that poses the choice between the helping and grabbing hand.
Let C and L be the respective benefits of the central and local government. With S as the budgetary revenue shared between the center and the local government and N as the off-budget revenue obtained and kept by the local government, we have
where α is the center's share of the budgetary revenue and h is the indicator of helping or grabbing hand behavior by local government. A higher h indicates more helping hand behavior or correspondingly a more constrained grabbing hand, and so (2) and (3), we have
Equation (8) indicates that the total return of helping more and grabbing less is reduced when α is large. The opposite is true when the center's share is small.
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[ Insert Table 2 here ]   Table 2 presents a game between the central government, which can choose high or low center tax shares (α L or α H ) and local government that can choose between helping or grabbing hand behavior (h H or h L ). We therefore have the following:
Hence, the ranking of benefits for local government is
Intuitively, the best outcome for the local government officials is L 1 , when low taxes are levied by the center and local government provides a helping hand. The returns to the local government are provided by informal sharing of the profits from the investments that are facilitated by the helping hand.
The outcome L 2 of low taxes remitted to the center and a grabbing hand is inferior to low taxes and the helping hand. The grabbing hand yields, other things equal, a lower return to local government officials than the helping hand. When taxes remitted to the center are high, this preference is reversed.
The incomes of local government officials are higher with a grabbing hand than a helping hand, that is L 3 >L 4 . The grabbing hand is a socially less productive form of corruption than investment facilitated by the helping hand. With high tax remissions to the center, local officials have an incentive to seek their private returns in ways that impede rather than encourage productive investment. The extortion through the grabbing hand is a redistribution of income that is paid before the investment is allowed to take place. The high taxes paid to the center make providing a helping hand in the investment less worthwhile.
Similarly, we have the following for the center in Table 2 :
From (5) Obviously, the best outcome for the center is high taxes for the center and a helping hand from local government officials for local industry at C 4 , and the worst is low taxes and a grabbing 11 hand by local government officials at C 2 . Whether (10) or (11) describes the preferences of the center depends on how much the helping hand helps the center and how much the grabbing hand grabs. When in response to high taxes the takings of the grabbing hand are substantial, the center prefers the outcome C 1 of low taxes and a helping hand. C 3 is preferred to C 1 when the takings of the grabbing hand are insubstantial. We can therefore identify the preferences (10) as indicating conditions under which personal corruption of the grabbing hand yields low returns, and the preferences (11) as indicating conditions where the returns to the personal corruption of the grabbing hand are substantial.
From Table 2 and (9), (10), and (11), we establish
Proposition 1
The unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is that the central government chooses to impose high taxes and that local government chooses the grabbing hand.
We also have
Proposition 2
The unique Nash equilibrium is independent of whether the preferences of the central government are described by the ranking of outcomes (10) or (11); that is, the Nash equilibrium is independent of whether the center is better off with low taxes and a helping hand or high taxes and a grabbing hand.
The Nash equilibrium is of course independent of the order of moves. We can however suppose that the center moves first to set taxes that it receives as high or low. The dominant strategy for the center is to choose high taxes, and in response to the high taxes the local government chooses to be a grabbing hand.
Efficiency depends on whether the local government has chosen to be a helping or grabbing hand. The local government indeed itself prefers the outcome when it is a helping hand, since the informal corruption of coercive profit participation with a helping hand is privately superior for local government officials to the more crass corruption of the impeding grabbing hand.
To examine the relation between efficiency and the Nash equilibrium, we place valuations on the outcomes for the center and for local government. Table 3 reproduces the interaction between the center and local government under the conditions of the center's preferences given by (10), with outcomes valued from 4 to highest to one for least preferred. The efficient outcome is a helping hand and low taxes, and the Nash equilibrium of high taxes and a grabbing hand is therefore clearly not efficient. To achieve the efficient outcome from the Nash equilibrium, both the center and the local government officials must change their decisions. We observe however also that, under conditions where the grabbing hand is insubstantially effective, the center prefers the Nash equilibrium to the efficient outcome.
[ Insert Table 3 here ] Table 4 shows outcomes when the grabbing hand is sufficiently effective for the center's preferences to be given by (11). That is, the center is better off (receives more tax revenue) when taxes are low and when the behavior of local government officials is described by the helping hand. Both the center and the local government now prefer the efficient outcome to the Nash equilibrium. The center no longer has a dominant strategy of choosing high taxes, and we see that, when the grabbing hand is effective, the center has an incentive to ensure the efficient outcome of low center taxes and a helping hand by a pre-commitment to low taxes.
[ Insert Table 4 here ]
Hence

Proposition 3
Although the unique inefficient Nash equilibrium is independent of the effectiveness of the grabbing hand, whether the center prefers the efficient outcome to the Nash equilibrium does depend on the effectiveness of the grabbing hand.
IV. The Relation to the Evidence
The theoretical model is actually very useful in explaining the central-local government interaction in China. As discussed in Section II, it started in the early 1980s with a low center tax share and the helping hand behavior of local government officials, following by the change to high center tax share in the 1990s and the subsequent shift of local governments to the grabbing hand behavior.
However, different stories can be told based on the same dynamic process. Tables 3 and   4 imply very different motivations of the center when it adopted the change from low to high tax shares. In the case of Table 3 , the center was very smart because it knew that the helping hand of local governments did not help the center very much and would not be efficient in gabbing either should it turn into the grabbing hand. Therefore, it deliberately changed to high tax shares in anticipating the better outcome even when the local governments shifted to the grabbing hand behavior. Table 4 , however, portrays a collective failure under a foolish center which did not understand that local government officials would change into the grabbing hand behavior when the center shifted to demand high tax shares. As a result, it ended up in the inefficient Nash equilibrium where both the center and the local were worse off.
There is another possibility which combines the conditions of Table 3 and Table 4 . In this case, the smart center started with the conditions in Table 3 and chose to move to the better outcome in the Nash equilibrium by shifting from low to high tax shares. However, it only found out later that it was actually worse off than before because the grabbing hand of local government officials became much more effective and the conditions in Table 4 prevailed.
We need to use empirical evidence to show which of these stories is the true. That the center changed from low to high tax shares in the 1990s can be easily established from the published data which are summarized in Tables 1 and 5 . However, it would be more difficult to measure the helping and grabbling hand behavior.
A. Measuring the Helping and Grabbing Hands
We determine empirically the extent of helping to grabbing hand behavior based on the different types of government revenue. The components of China's government revenue are (1) (Zhang 1999 ).
Extra-establishment revenue (EER) is the revenue collected by government departments
and organizations at the discretion of the officials themselves. No rules govern collection and there are no official statistics. The collection of the EER has been described as "san luan" (three times arbitrarily): collecting fees arbitrarily, imposing fines arbitrarily, and raising funds arbitrarily. The EER is most strongly associated with the grabbing hand, which uses authority of government to impose a variety of predatory regulations on business.
To measure the helping hand, we use the ratio of budgetary revenue to total government revenue. The ratio is lower, the higher proportion of government revenue that is outside the budget.
When off-budget revenue is substituted for budgetary revenue, the helping hand becomes weaker, because of the increased difficulty of promoting economic growth. Budgetary revenue is more conducive to the helping hand activities such as provision of public goods, infrastructure, and law and order. Off-budget revenues are more of the grabbing hand type. They are collected by different government departments and agencies under different names and justifications, and the use of such revenue is principally for privileged consumption.
grabbing hand.
There are a number of estimations for the EER at the national level. Three of these estimates are listed in Table 6 , together with our own estimation. Column A is from Zhang (1999), who assumes that the EER is entirely absorbed by fixed asset investment within the state owned enterprises. This assumption would result in underestimation, especially in the post-1994 period.
[ Insert Table 6 ] Column B is taken from the State Planning Commission Study Team (1999) . This study makes conservative assumptions about ratios of tax to non-tax revenue, but does not explain the rational behind these assumptions.
Column C is derived by Yang (1999) , who uses the residual method by deducting the budgetary revenues and the EBR from the estimated total government expenditure. Many assumptions are made when estimating total government expenditure, including values of investment expenditure and transfer payments.
Our estimation is in Column D. We begin with EER in 1985 close to zero. We base this on the observation that the EER was not significant in the mid-1980s. We take budgetary revenue and the EBR as adequate to cover government expenses. We use the revenue to GDP ratio of 1985 as a constant revenue-adequacy ratio throughout the sample period. Multiplying the ratio by GDP gives the adequate-revenue level. The EER is derived by subtracting the budgetary revenue and the EBR from the adequate revenue. The adequacy ratio is likely to understate the actual value of adequate revenues. However, the method allows us to provide estimated EER by provinces.
We construct the helping hand index from the estimates of EER. In Table 7 we see that, for most provinces, the helping hand index decreased between 1985 and 1993, as local governments shifted resources outside the budget in order to avoid sharing with the center. There was an acceleration after 1994.
The national helping hand index decreased by more than 30% from 0.67 in 1988-1993 to 0.43 in 1994-1998 . The same pattern is observed for most of the provinces, which indicates the change from helping hand to grabbing hand in response to the shift of the center from low to high tax in 1994. This confirms the prediction of our model.
[ Insert Table 7 here ]
B. Helping Hand and Investment
In order to understand how the helping hand actually helps, we consider the relationship between the helping hand index and investment, and specify the following investment equation:
where s and t indicate province and year, inv is fixed asset investment in 1985 prices, gdp85 denotes GDP in 1985 prices, help is the helping hand index, and ε is the error term. This is a fixed effect model with the varying coefficient for the helping hand index. The ability of local governments to help business investment declines as market reforms progress. In order to estimate the varying coefficient, we make use of the time trend variable t and the dummy variable dummy, which equals to 1 in 1994-1998 and 0 elsewhere. The estimation results are presented in Table 8 . The equation is estimated with four different dependent variables according to ownership types. The results confirm the role of the helping hand in promoting investment.
[ Insert Table 8 here ]
We observe that the coefficient of the helping hand index, which is significantly positive in all four equations, is greatest for investment by firms with ownership that includes private firms and foreign investment. The coefficient on the helping hand is also significantly greater for Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) than for State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and urban collectives. The helping hand is thus more effective for private investment and less so for the state-owned enterprises and urban collectives.
The declining coefficient of the helping hand index in TVEs and other ownership is evidence that the helping hand becomes less important as market reforms progress.
Since the dummy variable is also significantly negative, regional government became less effective in helping investment in the post-1994 period after the implementation of the recentralization measures.
C. High Taxes and the Grabbing Hand
Our model predicts that, when the center chooses a high share of budgetary revenue, the behavior of regional government changes from helping to grabbing hand. We can examine the relationship between high center taxes and the grabbing hand of regional government by specifying the following equation:
Here s and t indicate province and year, and grab is the grabbing hand index (grab = 1-help), cpi is Corruption Perception Index, local is the local revenue shares summarized in Table 5 , staff is the number of government officials and administrative staff, and ε is the error term.
We estimate three models using different definitions for staff. Staff1 is the number of government officials and administrative staff, Staff2 equals to Staff1 divided by population, and Staff3 equals to Staff1divided by non-agricultural population. Table 9 sets out the estimation results. The coefficient of local is significantly negative in all three models. This confirms that the lower the local revenue share (i.e. higher tax remittance to the center), the stronger is the grabbing hand, and supports the behavior predicted by our model.
Higher values of the Corruption Perception Index value indicate a less corrupt government.
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The coefficient of cpi is significantly negative for all three equations, which confirms our expectation that more corrupt governments grab more. Since the coefficients for the staff variables are all significantly positive, an increase in the number of government officials leads local governments to grab more.
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V. Conclusions
We have set out a model of strategic interaction between central and local government where local government chooses between helping and grabbing hands. The helping hand is motivated by a longer time horizon of predation. This is the hand of the stationary bandit. The grabbing hand is the hand of the roving bandit. So both helping and grabbing hand behavior are forms of corruption.
The empirical results based on our measures of the helping and grabbing hand confirm that helping hand promotes investment. The assistance is most effective for private firms and least effective for state-owned enterprises. However, the ability to help declines as the market transition progresses. The evidence supports the transition, after the change in center-local government tax-sharing system, from helping to grabbing hand behavior by local government.
We also find that the grabbing hand grabs more (1) when the center takes more from the revenue pool, (2) the government is more corrupt, or (3) the size of the government bureaucracy expands.
With the change from helping to grabbing hand, the differences attributed to the conduct of government in China and Russia diminished or disappeared. There is convergence in government behavior from the previously emphasized difference.
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The general conclusion is that a central government exerting authority to increase its claim over tax revenues can change the incentives facing local government officials, and 16 The source of the Corruption Perception Index is Transparency International. We use interpolation to fill in the values for four years in which the index is not available. 17 On the general theory of bureaucracy, and consequences of the expansion of bureaucracy, see Niskanen (1971) . Niskanen looks at self-interested behavior of bureaucracy under democracy. Our empirical results point to the same principles of self-interested behavior under autocracy. 18 See for example Walder (1995) .
introduce disorganized grabbing hand corruption. In China, when the center was politically weak and there was pre-commitment to a low remittance rate from local government to the center, local government provided a helping hand When the center felt politically capable, it chose high tax remittances from local government, which led to the inefficient Nash equilibrium of the grabbing hand of local government. The helping hand was corrupt, but nonetheless socially preferable to the corruption of the grabbing hand. Under the disorganized grabbing hand, growth slowed, since illegally diverted revenue cannot readily be used for investment. The revenue is used for consumption, or is diverted abroad.
19
The policy chosen by the center of high tax remittance from local governments and the accompanying re-centralization policies can be interpreted as a strategy for imposing efficiency from the center. If it is less attractive to be a government official, people might leave the political and bureaucratic domains of regional government and move to the more productive private sector. Less political intervention and fewer bureaucrats at the same time also enhance private market activities. Our study shows, however, that it may have been naïve to believe that redirection of taxes to the center would make being a government official sufficiently unattractive to entice departure from political and bureaucratic positions. The bandits became roving rather than stationary. The grabbing hand of disorganized roving bandits takes more, and is more inhibiting for private sector development, than the organized helping hand of stationary bandits, who contemplate the future tax base when deciding when and how to take -and to give. 19 Capital flight in 1997 is estimated to have been 40 billion US dollars, which is 90% of utilized foreign direct investment for China in the same year (Song 1999 Sources: Column A is from Zhang (1999) ; Column B from State Planning Commission Study Team (1999) ; Column C by Yang (1999) ; and Column D by the authors. 
